Marshall van Alstyne's joke of a solution to spam

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NonsenseInformation Week is running a story on how micropayments will stop spam. The idea, tipped by Marshall van Alstyne, is to make the sender pay if the message annoys the reader. It goes: A spammer sends you trash and wastes your time, he pays to compensate your time.

Sounds right? Think again! When was the last time you received a spam whose 'from' field was that of the real sender?

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Comments on Marshall van Alstyne's joke of a solution to spam

May 18th, 2005

Podz @ 12:11 pm #

Kitten wrote a plugin for that approach….doubt it works in 1.5 though

May 22nd, 2005

Tiger Lily @ 6:37 pm #

You miss the point! Strangers can't get through at all — it's a challenge response system — unless they're willing to promise not to send spam.

Go read the article from a year ago on ssrn.com if you want to say silly stuff…

August 16th, 2005

Izanami Caesar @ 1:59 am #

O! you are being so funny again, Marsh. Yep. When may be begin laughing?

September 28th, 2007

Marshall Van Alstyne @ 3:00 pm #

A friend alerted me to this post so I'd like to respond. We all seem to agree spam is a problem, but we also disagree on the merits of different approaches.

Sadly, this critique based on authentication misses the mark. If authentication were sufficient, we'd happily be done!

Authentication can reduce "spoofing," the practice of forging sender identity, but it can't stop spam. The problem is that spammers simply resort to sending from authenticated but unrecognized accounts. They just generate as many new accounts as they wish, then use each one until it's blacklisted (or its "reputation capital" spent), at which point they start over.

Generating accounts on free services is surprisingly easy. To pass new account tests, spammers just use the same AI technology used to recognize spam, or they outsource to truly low cost countries, or as pointed out on Slashdot they give away free porn to people who solve CAPTCHAS for them!

The Register ran a good article awhile back stating that spammers adopted authentication technology much faster than legitimate emailers. For reference, the reason why authentication alone can't work was anticipated in a nice peer-reviewed paper "The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms" back in 2001.

Authentication will help but it's no panacea. Part of the solution is to make spam differentially costly relative to non-spam, which is what we designed our proposal to do.

Cheers,
MVA

October 9th, 2007

Marshall Van Alstyne @ 11:30 pm #

Hi Denis, to playfully use your own language, you haven't yet convinced me of the validity of your objection ;-)

In particular, I'll challenge your assumption that a introducing a cost makes the problem worse because spammers will just steal micropayments.

In fact, I'll give you three reasons why requiring strangers to bond their messages should not only clean up recipients' inboxes it should stop spam at the sending source. The first two have long been recognized by security experts but the third is unique to our proposal.

First, almost everyone recognizes spam as an economic problem. Since digital messages cost almost nothing to send, even miniscule response rates make spamming profitable. If we can make spammers pay more than legit mailers, we can make it stop. Assuming, for the moment, that we can authenticate where bonds come from, an economic problem necessarily requires an economic answer. So we must start there.

Secod, you and others quite correctly observe that if virally infected PCs send bonded spam, then these 3rd party hosts would be motivated to fix their machines since their money will be at risk. Viewing this slightly differently, the bonding mechanism creates a rather extraordinary information benefit. It surfaces the infection and creates an audit trail. Previously, owners of infected machines didn't even realize they had a disease — stealing CPU cycles can easily stay hidden, while stealing someone's money quickly gets noticed; and there is a clear record of what happened. So, infections, if they happen at all, cannot last long.

Third, and this is the insight unique to our proposal, most people whose machines are used fraudulently will never have to pay a dime. Consider your own example: the stolen credit card. In the US, when a thief misuses your account, the bank indemnifies you against fraud provided that you report it in 24 hours. The expected value of your transactions is so much greater than the expected value of your losses that the bank insures you in order that you'll use their card. The same thing will happen here, only better. Now the ISP will insure you against fraud provided that it holds your accounts and gets to maintain the antivirus software. Bingo, problem solved! Now, not only is the individual user not at risk from fraud, but using the audit trail I highlighted above, an ISP can trace infections and spread a cure or patch to the machines that have a problem. This makes it harder to infect PCs in the first place.

So, not only does our proposal clean up recipient inboxes, it also helps prevent infections that are another source of the problem. Classification systems, no matter their mechanism, don't close this information feedback loop.

Just for fun, you should know that one of the world's leading security experts made the exact same mistaken objection on his blog, namely, he assumed that the prospect of fraud made bonding infeasible. I bet him that this was not the case and he wisely chose not to accept my bet. :-)

If you want more details on our bonding proposal, you can either check out our academic proof or you can just watch the technical talk I gave at Google last year on Google videos.

Best,
MVA

October 10th, 2007